Certificateless public key cryptography (CL-PKC) 
Introduction
Identity-based cryptography (IBC) was first put forward by Shamir [1] in 1984, which permits a user to utilize his identity information such as name, e-mail address, telephone number, etc. as his own public key. This public key is well-known and does not need a certificate to guarantee his authenticity. This greatly eliminates the certificate management problems in a conventional Public Key Cryptosystem (PKC). However, in an IBC, there innately exists a drawback named private key escrow because the cryptosystem needs a Private Key Generator (PKG), which is in charge of generating a user's private key on the basis of his identity. Consequently, the PKG can literally decipher any ciphertext and fake any user's signature on a message.
To solve the key escrow problem in IBC, Al-Riyami and Paterson [2] put forward Certificateless Public Key Cryptography (CL-PKC) in 2003. The CL-PKC is a medium between conventional PKC and IBC. In a CL-PKC, a user's private key is not produced by the Key Generation Center (KGC). Instead, it is composed of a partial private key produced by the KGC and a secret value picked by the user. Therefore, the KGC is unable to gain the user's private key. Thus, the key escrow problem in IBC can be solved. CL-PKC not only overcomes the key escrow problem in IBC, but also eliminates the usage of certificates in the conventional PKC. So, CL-PKC has attracted great attention, many certificateless cryptosystems have been designed, including many certificateless signature schemes and certificateless s encryption schemes, e.g. [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] .
The definition of signcryption was first proposed by Zheng [8] . Signcryption absorbed the functions of both public key encryption and signature synchronously, and outdoes the sign-then-encrypt method. Ring signcryption entitles a user to signcrypt one message along with identities of a group of potential senders, including the user himself, but does not reveal which user in the group has produced the signcryption in fact. Ring signcryption is an effective method for leaking trustworthy secrets anonymously, authentically and confidentially. The first identity-based ring signcryption scheme was proposed by Huang et al. [9] in 2005. Subsequently, several identity-based ring signcryption schemes have been constructed, such as [10] [11] [12] . However, Sree Vivek S. et al. [13] showed that the scheme in [10] has the security weakness. Selvi et al. [14] pointed out that schemes in [11] [12] are insecure against the chosen plaintext attacks. Zhu et al. [15] presented an efficient identity-based ring signcryption scheme from bilinear pairings. However, Deng et al. [16] show that the scheme is not secure and present an improved scheme.
Being a primitive in CL-PKC, certificateless ring signcryption (CLRSC) schemes are usually used in communication gaining anonymity, authentication and confidentiality. However, up to now, there are few research results on CLRSC. Recently, Qi et al. [17] constructed a CLRSC scheme based on bilinear pairings and claimed that the scheme is secure against both Type I and Type II adversaries, and satisfies the needs of confidentiality and unforgeability. Unfortunately, we found that Qi et al.'s CLRSC scheme cannot resist attacks from a Type I or a Type II adversary. In our attack, we show that a Type I or Type II adversary is able to decrypt any ring ciphertext generated for the receiver. Moreover, we point out that a Type I or Type II adversary can impersonate any sender to send a valid ring signcrypted message to a receiver.
The following sections are organized as below. In the next section, we review bilinear pairings and introduce the definition and the security notions for CLRSC scheme. In Section 3, we review Qi et al.'s CLRSC scheme. In Section 4, we give concrete attacks on Qi et al.'s CLRSC scheme. Conclusions are drawn in the last section.
Preliminaries
In this subsection, we briefly introduce bilinear pairings.
Bilinear Pairings
Let G 1 be a cyclic additive group of prime order q, and G 2 be a cyclic multiplicative group of the same order q. A bilinear pairing is a map ( , ) e P Q for all 1 , P Q G  .
Formal Definition of Certificateless Ring Signcryption
A CLRSC scheme consists of the following five polynomial time algorithms. Taking as input params, m, R and the ring member's public key PK i (1 in  ), and the actual sender's private key SK r , the receiver's identity ID A and his public key PK A , the algorithm outputs a ring signcrypted ciphertext . (V) -Unsigncrypt: On providing params,  , R, and PK i (1 in  ), the receiver's identity ID A and his private key SK A , the algorithm outputs the plaintext m if  is a valid signcryption from R to ID A . Otherwise, it outputs an error symbol ⊥.
Security Requirements of Certificateless Ring Signcryption
As mentioned in [2] , there exist two types of adversaries who have different capabilities in CL-PKC. Type I adversary imitates a dishonest user that does not have the knowledge of the master secret key but is able to replace a user's public key arbitrarily, while Type II adversary models a malicious-but-passive KGC who knows the master secret key but is not capable of replace the public key of the target user.
The basic security requirements of a CLRSC scheme are "Message Confidentiality", "Message Unforgeability" and "Message Anonymity". Message Confidentiality means that only the receiver can retrieve the message from the signcrypted text. Message Unforgeability means only one of the ring members can generate a valid signcrypted text. Precise definitions of Message Confidentiality and Message Unforgeability are defined using security models. For the detail, please refer to [17] .
Review of Qi et al.'s Certificateless Ring Signcryption Scheme
We review Qi et al.'s certificateless ring signcryption scheme [17] , which is specified by the following five algorithms:
-Setup(k): Given a security parameter k, the KGC chooses two groups G 1 and G 2 of the same prime order q a generator P in G 1 and a bilinear map -Partial-Private-Key-Extract: Given a user's identity ID i ∈ {0, 1}*, the KGC computes Q i =H 0 (ID i ) and outputs the user ID i 's partial private key D i =sQ i .
-Key-Extract: The user with the identity ID i chooses a random value t i ∈Z q *and sets his full private key as SK i =(t i , S i ) =(t i , t i D i ) and sets his public key as PK i =t i (P+Q i ).
-Signcrypt: To send a message m to the receiver with identity ID A and public key PK A , the sender with identity ID r and public key PK r uses his private key (t r , S r ) to perform the following steps:
(i) Choose n potential senders and form a group R={ID 1 , ID 2 , …,ID r , …ID n }.
(ii) Randomly pick r∈Z q * and compute 
Cryptanalysis of Qi et al.'s CLRSC Scheme
Qi et al. claimed that their scheme is both semantically secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks and existentially unforgeable against adaptive chosen message attacks. However, in this section, we describe our attacks on Qi et al.'s scheme [17] to show its security vulnerabilities. We show that Qi et al.'s scheme does not achieve the requirements of message confidentiality and unforgeability under a Type I/II adversary's attack.
Message Confidentiality Attack
In this subsection, we point out that Qi et al.'s scheme does not satisfy the property of message confidentiality. 
The Type I Adversary
A pub A e U t P S  .
(ii) Recover 
Unforgeability Attack
We show that Qi et al.'s scheme is universally forgeable by a Type I adversary A 1 or a Type II adversary A 2 . That is, Both A 1 and A 2 can arbitrarily forge a valid CLRSC ciphertext on any message with his choice on behalf of any sender. and all senders' public keys PK 1 , PK 2 , …PK r , …, PK n , the receiver ID A cannot detect that the sender ID r 's public key is replaced by A 1 , he decrypts the ciphertext as follows: 
The Type I Adversary
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Conclusions
Ring signcryptions can be used to protect privacy and authenticity of a collection of users who are connected through an ad-hoc network. In this paper, we analyze the security of a certificateless ring signcryption scheme proposed by Qi et al. and show that their scheme fails to satisfy the basic requirements of confidentiality and unforgeability for a secure certificateless ring signcryption scheme. Since no secure certificateless ring signcryption scheme is available in the literature, constructing an efficient and secure CLRSC scheme is our future work.
